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Sheila D. Collins and Gertrude Schaffner Goldberg (Eds.),
When Government Helped: Learning from the Successes and
Failures of the New Deal. Oxford University Press (2014).
$39.95 paperback, 360 pages.
In 2008 did we elect another Franklin Roosevelt or another
Herbert Hoover? This wonderfully comprehensive analysis of
the New Deal’s responses to the Great Depression and the responses of the Obama Administration to The Great Recession
addresses that question. It offers detailed comparisons of the
two administrations on banking, jobs, agriculture, the environment, labor, social movements, welfare, culture, and general
political economy. It documents the similarities and differences in the contexts within each had to operate: the political
skills of the president, the available channels of communication and his ability to use them, the strength and composition
of his party, the interest groups and social movements aiding
and opposing him, and other environmental, cultural, and international factors that each faced.
Several common themes emerge. One was Roosevelt’s superior ability to explain to the electorate what was happening
to them, what his policies were intended to accomplish, and to
do so with language that identified with traditional American
values. Sheila Collins concludes that the most important difference between the two presidents was that Roosevelt had a
broader vision of a new age that required the redefinition of
old American ideals like “liberty,” “security,” and “freedom.”
Obama’s “soaring rhetoric” was no substitute for the ability to
articulate policy in ways that would “forge alliances and win
over adversaries.”
Another theme was Roosevelt’s crucial vision of the interrelationships of problems, another point made by Collins,
which allowed him to devise policies to combat economic,
social, and ecological disasters simultaneously. The Civilian
Conservation Corps rescued a hoard of desperate, aimless
young men by putting them to work rescuing a ravaged landscape and turning it into splendid recreational opportunities,
all the while supporting their starving families back home.
The Tennessee Valley Authority similarly stopped deforestation and erosion, prevented disastrous flooding, improved
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commercial navigation, and electrified vast rural areas.
Obama’s Affordable Care Act may one day come close to
matching the multiple impacts of these policies, but his stimulus effort fell far short.
A third theme was the utility of radical movements to
Roosevelt’s left. Gertrude Goldberg shows how these multiple
groups of dissenters—jobless veterans, unemployed workers,
blacks, tenant farmers, elders, and “levelers” like Huey Long
and Father Coughlin—struck enough fear in the hearts of
New Deal opponents that if they did not accept Roosevelt’s
“slightly-left-of-center” programs, they might get something
far worse. Richard McIntyre argues that Roosevelt not only
used the militants and radicals to further his agenda, but also
controlled their influence within the collective bargaining
process that his legislation had made legal. McIntyre sees the
Communist-led unions as the most effective at resisting management and sees the current sorry state of unions as beginning
with the purge of the radicals from the New Deal “system.”
Obama, of course, cannot be blamed for not having enough
enemies on the left to frighten the right into compromise. He
might, however, have gotten farther by paying more attention
to advocates of “the public option” in health reform and less to
placating Republicans.
The greatest contrast between presidents is in the area of
job creation. The New Deal spawned a dozen programs that
created public jobs: huge infrastructure projects; small repair
projects; programs for artists, archeologists, draftsmen, totempole carvers, and all sorts for white-collar workers. Roosevelt
ignored the Republican mantra of supply-side economics and
put large amounts of money into the demand side. Investors
invest and businesses hire when people buy their goods and
services, not when they are offered tax breaks. And it worked.
The effects of these public works programs on the economy
could be seen both when they were initiated and when they
were, twice, temporarily cut back. The second withdrawal in
1937 triggered a recession that set back recovery several years.
Philip Harvey tells this story very well. He shows how direct
job creation is cheaper and more efficient than stimulating or
cajoling the private sector. In contrast, Obama, as Timothy
Canova notes, did not believe that the private sector could
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create jobs. In this he is clearly a Hooverite. And his pitiful
stimulus effort showed it. Canova connects this failure of jobs
creation to the backlash of the 2010 midterm elections. Had he
attacked and defeated unemployment first, argues Goldberg,
his reform of health care might have had more enthusiastic
support.
Though I have emphasized Roosevelt’s successes, this
book is no hagiography. It is as alert to the failures of the New
Deal as to Obama’s missed opportunities. There is still time to
learn from both.
Robert D. Leighninger, Jr., University of California, Berkeley
Steve Early, Save Our Unions. Monthly Review Press (2013).
$19.95 (paperback), 344 pages.
Save Our Unions is a sprawling collection of essays, covering everything from the Bread and Roses strike of 1912 to the
current struggles of the British Labour Party. The text includes
movie and book reviews, as well as journalistic accounts of
many contemporary U.S. labor struggles, and even author
Steve Early’s personal experience over many years of working
for the Communication Workers of America (CWA). The book
will offer practitioners a wealth of details with strategic implications for ongoing efforts. Academics will find hints of theory
throughout, and a series of cases with implications for longstanding debates in labor and social movement studies.
The seven thematic sections are bookended by an introduction and conclusion that contain a positive assessment of Sol
Roselli’s National Union of Healthcare Workers (NUHW). The
union was formed in the midst of a an intra-Service Employees
International Union (SEIU) conflict that came to the surface in
early 2009 when the SEIU International Union placed Roselli’s
massive California-based SEIU Local union under trusteeship
in a successful effort to remove him from power. Indeed Early’s
assessment of the conflict is woven throughout the book, and
anyone curious to understand the recent labor movement civil
wars—about which the author has written extensively in his
book The Civil Wars in US Labor—will be thoroughly engaged.
The first section of Save Our Unions addresses several cases
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